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1 Introduction
Empirical research on the geographic distribution of US federal spending shows quite con-
vincingly that small states (in population terms) receive disproportionately more dollars per
capita. Evidence of small state advantage is usually based on the correlation between federal
spending (or some specic spending program) and a linear or non-linear function of state
population. The most common explanatory variable used in the literature is senators per
capita, since small state advantage is often interpreted as the consequence of Senate overrep-
resentation. Interpreting the correlation between senators per capita and spending, however,
is problematic. In particular, it is not obvious that such correlation represents a causal e¤ect
of Senate malapportionment on the allocation of federal spending. This point is very clearly
spelled out by Wallis (2001):1 senators per capita is simply twice the inverse of the state pop-
ulation and the estimated negative relationship between spending per capita and population
may be driven by other important factors such as economies of scale,2 or the fact that several
spending programs are directly tied to population levels.3
The use of panel data with state xed e¤ects does not help to solve this problem: in longi-
tudinal data it is di¢ cult to disentangle budgetary lags from changes in over-representation.
In other terms, as states grow in population, and therefore fall in terms of representation, they
will also lose money per-capita unless the ow of money automatically adjusts to population
growth.
These problems can be overcome if an exogenous source of variation in malapportionment
could be identied, like in Elis et al. (2009), which uses periodic reapportionments in the
House, or in Ansolabehere et. al. (2002) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2008), which exploit
1The variable 1/POP represents lots of things. Some, like state ags per capita, have no meaning at
all. You, the reader, may interpret 1/POP however you like. But one cannot escape the conclusion that it
is a troubled proxy for political inuence. (...) If a variable represents two potentially competing hypotheses
simultaneously, that variable cannot discriminate between the two hypotheses.Wallis (2001), pag. 307.
2See for example Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). Wallis (1998), analyzing New Deal spending allocation to
the states, nds that economies of scale (for example in the large projects for infractructure building) provide
a very plausible explanation for the disproportionately large per capita spending received by small Western
states, characterized by a small population dispersed over a large land area.
3See for example Hoover and Pecorino (2005) and Levitt and Snyder (1995).
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court-ordered reapportionment of state legislatures. Unfortunately, in the case of the Senate,
the only determinant of variation in malapportionment is population. Whereas studies that use
narrowly dened spending programs can sometimes make a convincing case for the estimation
of a malapportionment e¤ect, this is quite di¢ cult for broad spending aggregates. At the same
time, studying the allocation of aggregate spending is important if we want to not only show
that an e¤ect of malapportionment exists, but to also quantify its overall relevance for the
federal budget. This is important because, as pointed out by Larcinese et al. (2006), various
and sometimes inevitable distortions introduced by di¤erent institutional arrangements may in
fact o¤set each other, leaving a state without a real advantage in the overall budget allocation,
even when an advantage can be found in some specic programs.
In this paper we show that, in spite of the di¢ culties we just mentioned, substantial
progress can be made in the estimation of the so-called small state advantage in the allocation
of large spending aggregates, whether that is due to malapportionment or to other scale e¤ects.
By revisiting the estimation methodology used by the existing literature, we provide new
results that address this question more directly. First, we show that - while small states enjoy
an advantage in the allocation of the federal budget - the estimated advantage is substantially
smaller than in previous studies. Second, we nd that states with fast growing population
loose federal spending to the advantage of slow growing ones. This happens independently
of whether they are large or small (in terms of population) and the e¤ect is concentrated on
federal grants.
Our estimates, obtained using the standard xed e¤ect specication for the period 1978-
2002,4 conrm the existence of a strongly positive correlation between senators per capita
and total federal outlays. We show, however, that this result is extremely non-robust to
specication changes and illustrate a number of rather puzzling ndings that cast doubts on the
prevalent interpretation of the available evidence. First, we show that the impact of senators
per capita vanishes in pure cross-section regressions, i.e. when state xed e¤ects are omitted.
Second, we nd that the e¤ect of overrepresentation is particularly strong on aggregates
4This represents the longest timespan ever considered in the literature.
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such as direct payments to individuals,5 while we do not nd any signicant e¤ect on defense
spending. This would imply the hardly justiable claim that direct payments to individuals are
somehow more prone to geographic manipulation and targeting than defense spending. Third,
if we omit senators per capita from our regressions and analyze the estimated xed e¤ects
(which should then contain the overrepresentation e¤ect) we discover that, after controlling
for socio-demographic indicators, larger states often receive more funds than average.
The absence of any e¤ect in pure cross-section regressions may suggest that xed e¤ects
are crucial to correct potential omitted variable bias, and there is certainly no doubt that xed
e¤ects estimates must be preferred in this case. Nevertheless, the inclusion of xed e¤ects
implies that the coe¢ cient of senators per capita is estimated from within-state variation of
state population. This point is particularly important because the coe¢ cient of senators per
capita is instead used to assess spending di¤erentials between states and, as we will discuss
in more detail below, this interpretation of the coe¢ cient conates two di¤erent e¤ects that
should instead be kept separate: a scale e¤ect (in each given period states have di¤erent
population size) and a change e¤ect (in each given state population changes over time). Once
population change and scale e¤ects are separated, the small state advantage remains, but is
reduced by about one half. Moreover, independently of whether large or small, states that
grow faster are penalized in the allocation of the federal budget. According to our estimates,
the ve fastest growing states lose on average between 1.3% and 5% of their budget during
the period 1978-2002. Analyzing di¤erent broad spending categories, we also nd that the
negative e¤ect of population dynamics varies depending on the type of spending. Federal
grants are the most a¤ected. Clear evidence of a small state advantage can be found instead
in defense spending only.
Hence, our analysis, besides delivering a di¤erent assessment on the magnitude of small
state advantage, indicates the existence of another important channel through which popula-
tion a¤ects spending. This resonates with the concerns voiced by several representatives of fast
5Direct payment to individuals include mainly entitlement programs such as social security, retirement
benets and health care programs.
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growing states on the fairness of budgetary allocations.6 Even the recent debate surrounding
the approval of the stimulus package under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, suggests that fast growing states are penalized in the allocation of important spending
programs.7
The factors that can be responsible for this important distortion are numerous and can be
traced back to the way the budget allocations are actually determined. First, reallocations of
funds are limited by the lack of information available for the drafting of the yearly budget.8
For example, several programs rely on outdated census data to distribute funds across states.9
Second, many programs are allocated by formulas that substantially reduce the responsiveness
of the budget to population changes. A report issued by the United States Government
Accountability O¢ ce in 2009 indicated that about 84% of federal aid is allocated through
formulas, and that specic rules - such as hold harmless provisions, caps, oors and ceilings -
imply that grant funding may be a¤ected less or entirely una¤ected by changes in population
(GAO 2009). Given the nature of the programs involved, the e¤ects of such restrictions are
potentially very important. For example, Medicaid - the single largest most important formula
grant - is administered under oor and ceiling restrictions (GAO 2009).
Our evidence is consistent with these mechanisms of budgetary inertia highlighted by policy
practitioners, and conrms the importance of formulas in the allocation of the budget. In
particular, we show that fast growing states are especially penalized in the allocation of formula
grants, whereas for non-formula programs the e¤ect of the population dynamics is substantially
smaller and has modest statistical signicance. In theoretical terms, our results are compatible
6Several pieces of legislation introduced in Congress between 1989 and 1993 by the representatives of
Florida, Arizona and California point out that the budget allocation based on decennial census data pe-
nalizes fast growing states. (Fair share act of 1989, 1992 and 1993. Source: The library of Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/)
7Fast growing states rank at the bottom in the allocation of transportation funds per capita in the stimulus
package (The Wall Street Journal, Who gets what from the stimulus package, January 27, 2009).
8As posited by a voluminous literature of behavioral incrementalisttheories of budgeting originated with
Wildavsky (1964), the limited temporal, nancial and cognitive resources available in each year do not allow a
rigorous re-examination of the current budget which is then determined by marginal changes to past budgetary
allocations.
9For an o¢ cial report see Federal Formula Programs: outdated population data used to allocate most
funds(GAO 1990).
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with behavioral incrementalist theories of budgeting (Wildavsky 1964), which claim the
current spending to be largely predetermined by past budget allocation.
Our analysis shows that the distinction between population size and growth is important.
Some small states grow very fast, some large states hardly grow. This complicates the nego-
tiations over the budget since the size of the states does not provide a clear line along which
coalitions can be formed. Population dynamics represents another important dimension along
which the interests of the states may be aligned. Our ndings suggest the existence of an
important divide between fast and slow growing states, which is at least as important as the
divide between small and large states and, for some spending programs, even more relevant.
Hence, the procedures that make public spending not su¢ ciently responsive to population
changes are responsible for a substantial part of the distortions that are currently interpreted
as a consequence of the size of the states alone.
2 Related literature
The literature on small state advantage consists mainly of studies of the consequences of
Senate malapportionment. In a purely functionalist view, the double representation principle
was devised by the founding fathers of the US constitution in order to balance the interests of
the small and big states. The combination of proportional and equal representation, together
with the House proposal power on budgetary matters, should grant adequate consideration
to the interests of all states, independent of their population size. Ansolabehere et al. (2003)
provide a formal model showing how the attribution of proposal power to the lower house
may indeed counterbalance the malapportionment in the upper house leading to an equal
distribution of per-capita government expenditure.10
The functionalist view has been increasingly challenged by recent research. Lee and Op-
penheimer (1999) equate Senate apportionment to a pandas thumb, the residual of a con-
tingent historical situation: the apportionment of the United States Senate did not result
10See Knight (2005) for an empirical investigation of the impact of the proposal power of individual con-
gressional representatives, such as committee members, over spending at the district level.
6
from the impartial application of any general principle - such as federalism or minority rights
- was instead the outcome of a clash between contending political interests within a particu-
lar institutional and ideological context.11 Evidence is now available about various types of
distortions generated by the equal representation principle in American politics and policy-
making.12 Some of this literature has focussed on the consequences of malapportionment
for the geographic distribution of federal spending, providing support for the idea that small
states receive a disproportionate share of the federal budget.13 The work of Atlas et al. (1995),
for example, analyzing biennial data between 1972 and 1990, nds a strongly signicant rela-
tionship between per capita representation in the US House and Senate and per capita federal
spending. These ndings are consistent with the results of previous work by Wright (1974)
which nds a positive relationship between New Deal spending and electoral votes per capita
that - as pointed out by Hoover and Pecorino (2005) - summarizes per capita representation
in the House and the Senate. Hoover and Pecorino (2005), considering a di¤erent time period
(1983-1999) and a broad range of spending aggregates, nd that statesrepresentation in the
Senate is positively related with total per capita outlays as well as with procurement, grants,
wages and pensions.14 On the other hand, Levitt and Snyder (1995) nd that districts from
more populous states receive in fact more (rather than less) federal spending.
Another strand in the literature has focused on more specic spending aggregates where
the impact of the Senate can be more precisely identied. Lee (1998), using Bickers and
Stein (1991) data on domestic outlays from 1983 to 1990, nds evidence of overspending in
11Lee and Oppenheimer (1999), p. 27. For a critical view of Senate representation in the US constitution
see also Dahl (2002).
12Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) consider, among other variables, the number and quality of contacts between
Senators and constituents, Senatorsfund-rasing e¤orts and strategies, the competitiveness of the electoral race,
the allocation of federal spending. They also nd a counter-majoritarian tendency to favor the minority party
(in popular vote terms) making it the majority party in Senate. Racial representation has also been shown to
be substantially biased against African-Americans and Hispanics (Gri¢ n (2006); Malhotra and Raso (2007)).
13The actual process through which Senate overrepresentation could generate a bias in federal budget
allocation might be related to congressional bargaining. Since less funds are necessary to obtain the same
increase in percapita expenditure in a smaller than in a larger state, senators who need to build winning
coalitions to bring federal spending to their constituents will typically ask smaller states to enter the coalition
to minimize the cost of buying political allies. Various arguments grounded on this basic premise can be found
in Lee (1998), Knight (2004), Knight (2008) and Dragu and Rodden (2010).
14They, however, nd a negative impact of House representation.
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small states for non-discretionary distributive programmes that are allocated via formulas
determined by the Congress. Lee (2000) nds that nal allocations from the 1991 and 1997-
98 reauthorizations of the federal surface transportation programme closely reect small-state
senatorspreferences, whereas analyzing surface transportation authorizations between 1956
and 1998, Lee (2004) shows that formulas passed by the Senate are more favorable to small
states. Knight (2004) does not nd strong e¤ects of Senate overrepresentation on aggregate
spending, although he does on earmarked projects: the e¤ect is particularly strong if the
earmark comes from the Senate. Hauk and Wacziarg (2007), using the authorizations from
the 2005 Highway Bill, conrm the existence of an overrepresentation e¤ect on transportation
earmarks. At the district level, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) analyze the e¤ect of unequal
representation prior to 1960 and the equalizing impact on state transfers to counties following
the court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s.15
The evidence provided by existing studies rises some fundamental questions on US bicam-
eralism. According to the estimates of Atlas et al. (1995), the di¤erence in real total spending
due to malapportionment between the most overrepresented (Wyoming) and the most un-
derrepresented (California) states amounts in 1990 to $1148 (in current dollars) per capita,
which is equivalent to approximately one third of federal spending in Wyoming that year.
They estimate that California would gain an additional $25 billion of federal spending if their
number of senators were proportional to the state population size. The estimated coe¢ cients
of senators per capita from other empirical studies point to similar magnitudes (Fleck (2001);
Hoover and Pecorino (2005); Larcinese et al. (2006)).16 Is small Wyoming really so much more
15There is some literature on the consequences of overrepresentation outside of the US context. Rodden
(2002) provides evidence on the impact of the overrepresentation of small countries in the EU. He nds that
agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers are disproportionately allocated
to small EU member states. See also Aksoy and Rodden (2009) for results on new EU member states.
Evidence from Japan is provided in Yusaku and Saito (2003), Shigeo (2006) and Shigeo and Ting (2008).
Pitlik, Schneider, and Strotman (2006) provide evidence from Germany.
16The magnitudes reported by Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) are substantially smaller. They use seven
years of data and a representation index with little within-state variation, which therefore does not allow the
inclusion of state xed e¤ects in the regressions. As we will see, including state xed e¤ects makes a substantial
di¤erence both in terms of the magnitude and signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients. Moreover, they focus
on programmes that represent an overall 56% of the federal budget, hence the nal magnitudes are necessarily
smaller than those obtained by using total federal spending.
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powerful than California as current empirical investigations seem to suggest? More generally,
do small states enjoy such a disproportionate leverage in the allocation of the federal budget?
In the remainder of the paper we will address this important question.
3 Some puzzling results
Population size varies considerably across US states and so does per capita Senate represen-
tation. Table 1 reports an index of average Senate overrepresentation by state during the
period 1978-2002.17 Under or overrepresentation is determined by comparison with a fair
representation given by the ratio between the total members of the Senate and the total US
population in a given year.18 States are ordered by average population in the period 1978-2002
(starting with the smallest) and obviously smaller states are overrepresented in the Senate.
Table 1 also reports average federal spending per capita by state in the period considered,
showing that there is no clear pattern linking Senate over-representation and spending. This
can be seen graphically in Figure 1, where the states are ordered along the horizontal axis
according to their average population in the period considered, while on the vertical axis we
report average per capita outlays. Figure 2 provides yet another visual representation of the
spending-overrepresentation link. Although it is apparent that Midwest states tend to be, on
average, both overrepresented and better funded, looking at the entire US map it becomes
clear that this is far from being a general statement.
A well established procedure to assess the impact of Senate representation on the geo-
graphic allocation of the federal budget amounts to estimating the following equation:
yst = yst 1 +   SPst + Nst + Zst + s + t + st; (1)
s = 1; :::48; t = 1978; :::2002;
17Like most of literature on the allocation of US federal spending, we focus on the 48 contiguous states.
18More specically, dene Nst as the population of state s in year t and USpopt as the total US population
(in the 48 states considered) in year t. Then the overrepresentation index in year t is given by 2Nst =
96
USpopt
=
USpopt
48Nst : This index is substantially equivalent to that reported in Tab. 6.1 by Lee and Oppenheimer (1999),
p.162.
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where yst is real per-capita federal expenditure (outlays) in state s at time t, yst 1 is its lag,
capturing the incremental nature of the budget,19 SP stands for senators per capita, measuring
Senate representation of the states, Nst is population, Zst is a vector of socioeconomic control
variables, and s and t represent respectively state and year xed e¤ects.
20
To interpret the coe¢ cients of equation equation (1), two remarks are in order. First, the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable implies that the impact of the independent variables
on spending is not transmitted in a single time period, but over a period of subsequent years.
The coe¢ cients of the regressors in equation (1) are short run multipliers, i.e. they capture
the impact in a single time period. It is then possible to compute long run multipliers, that
capture the cumulative e¤ects of the regressors over the years. This is done by dividing each
short run multiplier by 1 minus the lag of the endogenous variable.21 Hence, for example, the
long run coe¢ cients for SP is given by 
(1 ) , and for Nst is

(1 ) . Second, since we adopt a
functional form that includes both SP (a non-linear population term) and a linear population
term, the marginal e¤ect of population (Nst) on real per capita spending (yst) for the short
run is given by 
@yst
@Nst

SR
=  

2
N2st
  

(2)
The corresponding long run coe¢ cient is

@yst
@Nst

LR
=  

2
N2st(1  )
  
(1  )

(3)
This implies that the scale e¤ect is non-linear and this must be taken into account while
computing the size and signicance of the populations coe¢ cient. Hence, whenever both
SP and a direct population term are included we also report the overall marginal e¤ect of
19For a discussion of this point see Lee and Oppenheimer (1999), p. 172.
20Including both a lagged dependent variable and state xed e¤ects introduces a bias in the estimated
coe¢ cients Nickell (1981). This bias is declining in T (see Greene (2003), p. 307) and Monte Carlo simulations
tend to show that, for T > 20, while the bias in may remain sizeable, the bias in the other coe¢ cients becomes
very small (Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999)). Moreover, the alternative IV estimates (see for example
Arellano and Bond (1991)) tend to be generally less e¢ cient. The time dimension in most of our regressions
is equal to 25 and it is never inferior to 20, hence our choice of estimating equation (1) by OLS.
21The formal derivation of the long run multipliers is reported in Appendix.
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population evaluated at the average population value in our sample (both the short-run and
long-run coe¢ cients).
We start by estimating equation (1) using Census data for the US States during period
1978-2002.22 Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 and estimates in Table 3. We start
with a simple regression of real federal spending (outlays) per capita on senators per capita
and then progressively include lagged spending, population, year dummies, socioeconomic
control variables and, nally, state xed e¤ects. Only the introduction of xed e¤ects renders
statistically signicant the estimated coe¢ cient b.23 The population e¤ect at the mean is
instead statistically signicant when we introduce year xed e¤ects (column 4) and remains
so in the short run if socioeconomic control variables are introduced (column 5). In any event,
when we include state xed e¤ects both the size and the magnitude of the overall impact of
population are much larger. The short run coe¢ cient is around sixty times larger, the long
run four times.24 This result is not driven by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In
column (7) we remove yst 1 and the result remains quite similar (with an overall coe¢ cient
of population which is precisely half-way between the short and the long run coe¢ cients of
column (6)).
Given the importance of including state xed e¤ects, it is clear that the estimated impact
of malapportionment relies predominantly on the variation of SP within states over time,
with a more limited role being played by between variation, despite the large di¤erences in
state per capita representation. Although these results suggest the existence of a potentially
important omitted variable bias in cross-section regressions (which is corrected by the intro-
duction of xed e¤ects), they should be interpreted with caution, since within state variation of
population can have a direct negative e¤ect on spending independently of overrepresentation.
In Tables 4a and 4b we use as dependent variables the spending aggregates (outlays)
22Census data for most spending categories are available starting from 1978, the exceptions being grants
(available from 1977) and salaries (available only from 1982 onwards).
23Similar results can be obtained from yearly cross-section regressions or by using the between estimator.
These estimates are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
24These results are consistent with the ndings of Lee (1998), Oppenheimer and Lee (1999) and Knight
(2004), who also nd a modest impact (at least if compared with studies that use xed e¤ects estimates) of
overrepresentation in cross-section regressions.
11
available from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.25 We report specications both
with (Table 4a) and without (Table 4b) xed e¤ects (but always including year dummies and
socioeconomic control variables). Once again, introducing the state xed e¤ects makes a big
di¤erence for the sign and signicance of the SP coe¢ cient. In the specication without
xed e¤ects, only for grants the coe¢ cient of senators per capita comes with the expected
positive and signicant sign. In all other cases, the coe¢ cient is either insignicant, as in the
case of direct payments to individuals and salaries, or it is statistically signicant but has the
wrongnegative sign, as in the case of defense spending. In any event, if we consider the
overall impact of population on spending, the short-run coe¢ cient of direct payment is the
only one to be signicant.
When state xed e¤ects are introduced (Table 4b), the impact of senators per capita
becomes positive in all the equations and it is statistically signicant in the case of direct
payments to individuals, salaries and grants. In this last case, the coe¢ cient has almost been
doubled by the introduction of state xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient of senators per capita is
instead insignicant when we consider defense.26 The overall negative impact of population
is strong and statistically signicant for grants and salaries (both in the short and long run),
and for direct payments to individuals (short run only). The impact of population is never
signicant for defense. This, however, is a spending aggregate that is at least as likely to be
subject to geographic manipulation as direct payments, salaries, and grants.
Finally, we estimate equation (1) without the SP indicator. In this case we expect the
e¤ect of malapportionment to be incorporated in the state xed e¤ects. Figure 3 plots the
estimated xed e¤ects versus the average state population (in the period considered).27 The
25The statistical abstract reports yearly outlays at state level by program (direct payments to individuals,
salaries and grants) and by agency (defense and non defense). Procurement spending (for which large amounts
of funds are appropriated to be spent over the course of many years ) is instead not recorded on an outlay
basis. Therefore, a note of caution applies to defense spending for which it is not possible to isolate the pure
outlays components from the long term investments (often decided far back in time) that display very limited
yearly variation.
26Our results are di¤erent from Atlas et al. (1995) who nd a signicant impact of senators per capita on
defense. If we run our regression only for the period 1978-1990, we also nd a signicant e¤ect. However, the
signicance disappears in the larger sample.
27Using average population is a meaningful exercise since the ranking of the various states in population
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picture is rather di¤erent from what one would expect if population size had any e¤ect. When
looking at total federal spending, and after controlling for socioeconomic indicators, larger
states appear to receive more funds than smaller ones. Virginia and Maryland, because of
their proximity to DC, and New Mexico, because of large defense infrastructure, represent
the only exceptions. The advantage of large states is very clear for entitlements (with North
Dakota being the sole exception), while no clear pattern can be found for other spending
aggregates.
Overall, these results provide a rather puzzling picture which - in light also of the large
magnitude of the estimated e¤ects in specications including xed e¤ects - cast doubts about
what exactly is estimated by using SP as an explanatory variable. Since the number of sena-
tors is xed and equal to 2 for all states, the variable SP in equation (1) is simply a constant
divided by the population. In other words, SP varies only because population varies. Inter-
preting the coe¢ cient of SP as the impact of malapportionment is not an obvious step. How
much of the inverse relationship between SP and federal spending is due to malapportionment
remains moot.28
terms is relatively stable over the period considered.
28To make this point clearer it can be useful to rewrite the basic equation (1) making explicit how it depends
on the population term. Omitting for simplicity the error term, the time dummies and the lags, equation (1)
can be written as: YstNst =   2Nst + Nst +  zstNst + s. Where Yst is total federal spending in state s at
time t, Nst is total population, zst is a vector of control variables expressed in total per state (instead of
per capita) levels. The overrepresentation indicator is given by 2Nst . The above equation, with or without
xed e¤ects, cannot identify the impact of overrepresentation on spending per capita from that of any other
e¤ect induced by population variation. In fact, if we multiply both sides of the equation by Nst, we obtain:
Yst = 2 + N
2
st + zst + sNst: In this equation, the e¤ect of overrepresentation on total spending ( Yst)
is captured by the constant term (2). Hence, any factor that induces a positive constant term in the total
spending regression would be interpreted as overrepresentation in per capita spending equation. The factors
that can possibly be captured by the constant term are very numerous and it is not obvious how to infer
whether overrepresentation is the most important of them.
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4 Small state advantage, population dynamics and fed-
eral budget allocation
Having established that the impact of malapportionment cannot be identied by estimating
equation (1), even when xed e¤ects are included, we now turn to a more general question
about small state advantage. Admitting that we cannot identify the impact of malapportion-
ment does not imply that no progress can be made to establish whether small states indeed
receive more federal monies and, in case of an a¢ rmative answer, why. This leads us to an-
other identication problem. Population variation across states may induce variation in per
capita federal spending via two main channels. First, states may receive di¤erent amounts of
spending because they di¤er in their population sizes (scale e¤ect). Second, independently
of their size, their spending allocation can vary because of pure population dynamics (change
e¤ect).
Di¤erences in spending per capita due to the scale e¤ect may arise because states are
di¤erently represented in the Senate, but also as a consequence of the possible economies of
scale in the provision of goods and services in the most densely populated states. Isolating
an overall scale e¤ect is important because it would give us an upper bound of the impact of
malapportionment on spending. The problem, however, is that an inverse relationship between
spending per capita and population can also be observed whenever, because of inertia, yearly
changes in per capita spending do not exactly reect yearly changes in population. In this
case, fast growing states, independently of their size, could see a decline of per capita spending
because budgetary provisions do not adequately respond to population trends.
When using panel data the scale e¤ect and the change e¤ect - if nothing is done to isolate
them - are conated into one single coe¢ cient. Given the puzzling results reported in the
previous section, we have good reasons to think that at least some of the estimated population
e¤ect is due to population dynamics rather than to the di¤erent population size of the states.
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4.1 Population dynamics and budgetary inertia
The US states are remarkably di¤erent in their population dynamics. During the period we
consider (1978-2002), for example, the population of Nevada tripled, while that of Florida
and Arizona doubled. At the same time, in states like West Virginia, North Dakota, Iowa or
Pennsylvania the population in 2002 is either slightly below or just slightly above the level of
1978.
States with a fast growing population may be disadvantaged in the distribution of federal
funds since several factors contribute to generate inertia in the allocation of the federal budget.
First, as pointed out by incrementalist theories (Wildavsky (1964) ; Davis et al. (1966);
Dempster andWildavsky (1979)), the complexity of the budget implies that new provisions are
determined mainly by marginal changes to previous ones. Second, formulas play an important
role in explaining budgetary inertia. For several programs, hold-harmless provisions guarantee
that the funds allocated to a state will be no less than a specied proportion of a previous years
funding.29 If a population change results in a decrease in funding below a designated amount,
the hold harmless provision would raise the amount to designated one. At the same time,
the amount of the increase would be deducted from the funding of other states not a¤ected
by the hold-harmless provision. In an analogous way, caps impose a limit on the size of an
annual increase as a proportion of a previous years funding so that, if a population change
produces an increase in funding above a certain amount, the cap would limit its e¤ect. Floors
and ceilings operate in a slightly di¤erent way, but have similar implications: if a change in
population reduces funding below the oor, a state would be guaranteed the amount specied
by the oor, whereas if the allocation exceeds the ceiling, the state cannot receive more than
the ceiling amount.30 Finally, the use of outdated population data in formulas penalizes
states whose population grows fast.31 As we will see, the budgetary inertia introduced by
29For example, a 100% hold-harmless provision is currently in place for the Title I education program and
the WIC (Women, Infant and Children). For a detailed report on formula programs see CNSTAT (2003).
30For example, the Title I education program state expenditure per pupil is restricted to a range between
80% and 120% of the national average per pupil expenditure. In the special education program no children
may receive more than 40% of the average per pupil expenditure in US public elementary and secondary
school. Other important programs subject to limits are the Federal Highway Program and Medicaid.
31In a testimony (26 February, 2008) to Congress concerning State Childrens Health Insurance program
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these mechanisms can have important consequences for the allocation of federal money.
A simple graphical analysis can illustrate quite e¤ectively the relationship between spend-
ing per capita and state population. We construct two indices that capture for each state the
evolution over time of their respective spending and population shares (of the US total).32 An
index equal to 0 means that the state share of US total spending (population) is the same as
in 1978, i.e. that the state spending (population) is increasing at the same pace as the US
average. An index above 0 means that the state spending (population) grows above the US
average and therefore has a higher share of the US total compared to 1978, with 100 indicating
that such share has doubled. Negative values indicate instead decreasing shares.
The evolution of these two indices over time, reported in Figures 4a and 4b, shows a remark-
able degree of divergence: an above average increase in population is almost always mirrored
by a below average increase in federal spending per capita. For example, California and Texas
are two underrepresented states with fast growing populations and correspondingly decreasing
federal spending per capita. Pennsylvania and Ohio are also heavily underrepresented, but
with a decreasing population: they display an increase in the federal spending index, i.e. an
above average growth in spending per capita. Similar patterns can be seen among overrep-
resented states. In Wyoming the population was growing rapidly until the mid-eighties and
its share of spending per capita was decreasing correspondingly. Once, however, the popu-
lation growth decelerates compared to the national average, its share of spending per capita
starts increasing. Utah has an increasing population share and a decreasing spending share,
whereas the opposite holds in West Virginia. In Nevada - an overrepresented state with the
(SCHIP), the governor of Georgia Sonny Perdue states that The current funding formula is also awed
because it hurts fast growing states, like Georgia, by lagging behind by as much as four years in factoring in
quickly changing population numbers. In our 2007 scal year, the federal government was using population
numbers from 2004, 2003 and as far back as 2002. Georgia has grown by almost a million peoples since 2002.
We need data that is reective of the actual population and need.(source: http:nngov.georgia.gov accessed
on April 20 2008).
32For spending we construct a size invariant index by dividing the state per capita spending in each year
by its value in 1978 (and multiplying the result by 100). We also construct an analogous index for the overall
spending in the United States. The di¤erence between the state spending index and its corresponding US
index will then describe the relative change of spending in a state compared to the US average. We then
construct an analogous index for the population of each state by subtracting from our previously computed
scale independent index of population its corresponding US index.
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fastest growing population in the US - the spending index is always below its 1978 level and
continuously decreasing.
The next section conrms the basic intuitions provided by this simple graphic by using
regression analysis.
4.2 Estimating scale and change e¤ects
To separate the e¤ect due to change from the e¤ect due to scale we construct a scale inde-
pendent index of population change (POPIND) that we will then introduce in our baseline
regression specication. This index is constructed by dividing the population of every year by
the population of the base year (1978). Hence, in 1978 the index (POPIND) is equal to 100
for all states, and in all the other years the index measures the deviation of the state popula-
tion from the same base year. The pattern of POPIND for all states during the entire period
is summarized in Figure 5. As we can see, states display very distinct patterns. Moreover,
large, medium or small states can be equally found among the fastest growing as well as the
slowest growing states. For example, among the three fastest growing states, we have Nevada
with an average 1978-2002 population of 1.2 million, Arizona with 3.7 million and Florida
with 12.7 million. Similarly, among slow-growing states we have New York with an average
population of 18 million, as well as Connecticut with 3.2 million and North Dakota with 0.6
million.
Figure 6 provides a map representing average POPIND by state in the period 1978-2002.
It should be compared with Figure 2, which reports the corresponding map for population
and federal spending per capita. As we can see, the least populated states in the North-East
seem to be advantaged in the allocation of federal spending if compared to populous states
such as California, Texas and Florida. For these states we also have an inverse relationship
between federal spending and POPIND. These states conform to an important claim made
by Lee (1998) and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999), that the large states are also those that grow
faster and vice-versa: hence the small (and slow-growing) states often secure more funds by
negotiating formulas that guarantee minimum allocations.
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It is certainly true that, if one takes a very long term perspective on this matter, then the
fast growing states will also tend to be larger, and states that do no grow will shrink in relative
terms. The di¤erences in size between states, however, are so large that it would probably
take many decades if not centuries to reach a good alignment between size and growth. In
fact, over the period we consider (twenty ve years), there is almost no switch in the ranking
by size, despite the very marked di¤erences in population growth. Some small states - like
Nevada and Utah - experience a very rapid population growth, whereas some large states like
New York and Philadephia grow very little. This implies that when formulas are negotiated,
the interests of the states are not easily aligned along the population size dimension and, in
fact, if we look at the average spending distribution, states like Nevada and Utah seem to be
disadvantaged if compared to states like New York and Pennsylvania no less than if compared
to the small and static states of the North-East. If scale and change e¤ects went exactly in the
same direction for all or most states, it would be hard to separate the two. We can separately
estimate the scale and change e¤ects precisely because this is not the case.
We can use POPIND to purge our scale coe¢ cients of any e¤ect due purely to population
change and therefore identify the scale e¤ect (which is an upper bound of over-representation).
Returning to equation (1), the new specication becomes:
yst = yst 1 +   SPst + Nst +  POPINDst + Zst + s + t + st; (4)
s = 1; :::48; t = 1978; :::2002;
The results reported in column 1 of Table 5 show that the scale-independent measure of
population change is key to explain federal budget allocation to the states.33 The coe¢ cient
of POPIND is negative and signicant, implying that fast growing states are penalized in
the allocation of the federal budget, independently of their population size.34 On the other
33An alternative estimation strategy consists of introducing state specic trends, ts, in our basic specication.
The results obtained with this alternative specication mirror quite well those obtained with POPIND but
have the disadvantage of not making explicit the source of the trends (results are available from the authors
upon request).
34As a further robustness check, we also introduced an interaction term between SP and POPIND. This
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hand, once we control for the scale independent population change, the coe¢ cient of senators
per capita remains signicant, but its magnitude is reduced to about one half of the value
estimated in column (6) of Table 3. The same is true for the overall scale e¤ect, evaluated at
the average population level, whose size is halved by the introduction of POPIND, both in
the short and long run.
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions. First, states whose population grows
faster are penalized in the budget allocation independently of whether they are large (and
hence underrepresented in the Senate) or small (and hence overrepresented): this suggests that
the budget fails to respond to population changes at an adequate pace. Second, the coe¢ cient
of SP - as well as of the overall scale e¤ect - is reduced by half when change and scale e¤ects
are separated. Conating these two coe¢ cients leads to a serious overestimation of the scale
e¤ect and, therefore, of the upper bound of the potential impact of overrepresentation. It
is, however, important to stress that our analysis conrms the presence of a pure small state
advantage (scale e¤ect) in the allocation of total federal spending.
Finally, the impact of POPIND on spending is of a realistic magnitude. For example,
the estimates of Table 5 (column 1) imply that, if in 1990 California had the same POPIND
of Wyoming (106.7) then, everything else being equal, California would have received $57.75
per capita more than what predicted by using its actual POPIND (134.2). This represents
less than 2% of the actual Californias per capita spending in 1990. In Table 6 we report
the average gains and losses (in 1983 USD) implied by our estimates of the change e¤ect
reported in column (1) of Table 5. These have been computed by comparing, for each state,
the predicted federal spending per capita implied by the average POPIND in the state during
the period 1978-2002, with the federal spending per capita that the state would have received
if its POPIND was equal to the US average during the same period. The most penalized
state, Nevada, is obviously the fastest growing state. Its average per capita loss per year is
around 166 USD, or about 5% of its average budget. Such gains and losses do not appear to
term should capture the possibility that small and large states have di¤erent bargaining power when di¤erent
population growth rates induce the renegotiation of budgetary allocations. This interaction term turns out to
be statistically insignicant, while the results for POPIND and SP remain robust both in terms of sign and
signicance of their coe¢ cients.
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be related to the population size of the states.
5 Scale and change e¤ects in di¤erent spending cate-
gories: further evidence
Population change and scale e¤ects should play a di¤erent role in di¤erent spending programs.
For some spending categories, such as defense, there is no reason to expect population dy-
namics to play any particular role, whereas scale e¤ects might actually be quite important.
For formula programs, like many types of grants where population is an important input 
fast growing states might be severely penalized by formulas that impose restrictions on yearly
funding changes, as well as by the use of outdated population data. This would not rule out
possible scale e¤ects either due to economies of scale or to political pressures, since formulas
can incorporate economies of scale and are, to a certain extent, manipulable too. The same
can be said of public spending in salaries since public services and personnel may not grow at
the same pace as the overall population growth and, at the same time, a small state advantage
in this type of spending cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, there are no immediate rea-
sons for direct payments to individuals to display any sort of small state advantage. In fact, as
pointed out in Section 2, the negative and signicant coe¢ cient found for direct payments to
individuals using the standard specication (1) is particularly puzzling given the entitlement
nature of the programs involved. Equally surprising is the absence of a signicant e¤ect on
defense spending. When we add POPIND to the basic specication we obtain very di¤erent
results delivering a more plausible assessment of the advantage enjoyed by small states.
The estimated coe¢ cients, reported in columns 2-4 of Table 5, show that for grants, direct
payments to individuals and salaries, introducing POPIND renders the coe¢ cient of SP
statistically insignicant (compare columns 2-3-4 of Table 5 with columns 6-7-8 in Table 4b),
whereas the coe¢ cient of the linear population term is now negative and signicant for salaries
only. Most importantly, the overall scale e¤ect does not display a signicant coe¢ cient neither
in the short run nor in the long run in any of the specications reported in column 2-4 of
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Table 5.
On the other hand, for defense spending (Table 5, column 5), we nd an overall negative
and statistically signicant scale e¤ect, which becomes substantially larger and more signi-
cant in the long run. This result, which refers to an overall scale e¤ect and cannot therefore
unambiguously be identied as malapportionment, is nevertheless at least consistent with the
idea that defense spending is prone to some manipulation in geographic terms. POPIND has
a negative impact on direct payments to individuals, grants and salaries, but the statistical
signicance is above the 10% threshold for grants only. On the other hand, as one would
expect, population dynamics plays no signicant role in the defense equation. Finally, column
6 shows that the scale e¤ect found on total federal spending (column 1) is mostly due to
defense. When we regress all non-defense spending on our explanatory variables, the scale
e¤ect loses its statistical signicance both in the short and in the long run. The impact of
POPIND becomes stronger instead both in magnitude and signicance.
Since formulas may play a crucial role in limiting the response of the budget to population
changes, we conduct a further check using data on grants that allow us to distinguish between
formula and non-formula programs. To this end, we have used the information provided by the
Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) to identify the programs that are allocated
by formula. Formula grants are dened in the CFDA as allocations of money to States or
their subdivisions in accordance with distribution formulas prescribed by law or administrative
regulation, for activities of a continuing nature not conned to a specic project. Both
formula and non-formula programs in the CFDA are identied by the same codes used in the
Consolidated Federal Fund Report (CFFR), which contains data on federal grants allocation
to the states on an obligation base, starting from 1983. Hence, by matching the information
from the CFDA with the spending data from the CFFR, we have classied federal aid into
two categories, formula and non-formula grants. With the exception of Wyoming - which
receives on average (during the entire period) roughly equal amounts of formula and non-
formula grants - the amount of funds allocated by formula is on average always larger than
the non-formula for all states. In the period we analyze, slightly over 67% of federal aid is
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allocated via formulas.35 This is not surprising given that formula programs include several
large important items such as Medicaid, Title I education grants to local authorities, Highway
planning and construction, and Community development block grants. On the other hand,
non-formula grants consist mainly of project grants which provide funding for specic projects
(such as fellowships, scholarships, research grants, training grants, planning and construction
grants) for xed or known periods.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 we verify that the results obtained by using CFFR data
(available from 1983) are very similar to those previously obtained by using data from the
Statistical Abstract. We then compare formula and non-formula grants starting from the
standard specication without POPIND. From columns 3 and 4 it is clear that a small state
advantage only appears for formula grants. The short-run marginal e¤ect of population in
the case of formula grants is almost seven times larger than that of non-formula grants. The
long-run marginal e¤ect is ten times larger. These coe¢ cients are statistically signicant at
a 5% level for formula grants and very far from statical signicance for non-formula grants.
Column 5 shows that these results are not robust to introducing POPIND. In other words,
the small state advantage that seems to characterize formula grants can be attributed in large
part to population dynamics, as conrmed by the strong statistical signicance of POPIND
in the formula grant regression. POPIND is instead only weakly statistically signicant (10%
level) for non-formula programs and displays a substantially smaller coe¢ cient.
It remains quite possible that a small state advantage is present for some specic programs
within our broadly dened spending categories, in particular for grants. As discussed in the
Introduction, several studies make a convincing case in that direction. However, not nding
a strong e¤ect on the large aggregates implies that the overall magnitude of this e¤ect is
conned to some particular or small program that it is compensated by countervailing forces
in other programs.
Our conclusion from this analysis of broad spending aggregates is in line with our previous
ndings: separating scale and change e¤ects is important, since population dynamics matters
35Lousiana has the highest average share with 76% and only Colorado, Massachusetts, Maryland and
Wyoming have less than 60%. Detailed tables can be provided by the authors upon request.
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for the allocation of federal spending. Population change and scale play di¤erent roles in
di¤erent spending aggregates. Population dynamics is an important predictor of spending
di¤erentials across states when we consider grants. On the other hand, small states enjoy a
substantial advantage in the allocation of defense spending.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have reconsidered the small state advantage hypothesis by analyzing data
on the allocation of the US federal budget over the period 1978-2002. We have focused in
particular on the limits of the standard econometric specication and on the interpretation
of its coe¢ cients to reach the conclusion that, while small states enjoy an advantage in the
allocation of the budget, a substantial advantage is also provided by having a slow population
dynamics. Hence, the size of the states does not uniquely dene a dividing line between their
interests. When population dynamics is taken into account, small but fast growing states may
end up on the same side of large and fast growing ones. The same is true for large and small,
but slow growing states alike. In short, population dynamics is an important predictor of
federal budget allocations: small but fast growing states lose funds to large but slow growing
ones.
A small state advantage may occur because of the economies of scale associated with some
public programmes. In this case it should not raise much concern since spending di¤erentials
would serve the purpose of equalizing welfare across states. A less benign interpretation,
however, is that a small state advantage may occur because of di¤erentiated representation
in the policy making process, particularly through Senate malapportionment. The standard
measure of Senate overrepresentation is the number of senators per capita. This indicator,
however, is perfectly correlated with the state population and therefore does not allow to
separate the impact of overrepresentation from that of any other variable that might happen
to be correlated with the population size of a state. Moreover the use of senators per capita in
spending regressions that use longitudinal data and state xed-e¤ects do not isolate the role
of small state advantage (scale e¤ects like malapportionment or economies of scale) from that
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of population growth (change e¤ects for a given population size). When we include a pure
population changevariable in our estimations, we nd that the population scale e¤ect is
reduced by half and is mainly driven by defense spending. Our conclusion is that the impact
of small state advantage on large spending programs has been substantially overestimated
and that we need an alternative (or, at least, a complementary) explanation for the rather
puzzling evidence accumulated by the abundant empirical literature on this issue.
Our analysis reveals that, once we disintagle scale and change e¤ects, fast growing states
are disadvantaged in the allocation of the federal budget independently of their population
size. This may in part be due to the di¢ culties of collecting and processing all the information
necessary to guarantee to every state a fair share of the budget. However, even when such
information is available, budgetary rules and formulas, whose determination is not isolated
from the political process, can prevent fair reallocations of the budget. The recent reform of
Title I education programs provides an instructive example. To meet the increased education
needs of fast growing states, decennial Census data on population have been replaced by
biennial Census estimates. At the same time, senators of shrinking and slow growing states
have managed to obtain the implementation of a 100% hold harmless provisionthat, in the
absence of any signicant increase in annual appropriations, has de facto neutralized the use of
updated data, preventing the reallocation of funds toward more needy states. This shows how
Congressmen are actively engaged in bargaining over the federal budget allocation to bring
bacon home, and how rapid shifts in population can create an important divide between the
interests of fast growing as opposed to shrinking or slow growing states. The redistributive
e¤ects associated with large population shifts open an important avenue for future research.
Understanding how budgetary provisions for specic items are negotiated within Congress
when large population changes occur, and whether they are a¤ected by institutional and
political features, such as committee representation, party politics and electoral considerations,
are very fundamental questions that we leave for future investigation.
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Appendix
Short and long run multipliers
Consider equation (1) in Section 3:
yst = yst 1 +   SPst + Nst + Zst + s + t + st (1)
This specication implies that the impact of the independent variables on spending is not
transmitted in a single time period, but over a number of subsequent years. This assumption
is captured in the literature by using the so-called distributed lag analysis (Koyck (1954);
Jorgenson (1966)). We use a very common lag structure, known as Koyck (1954) transfor-
mation, which assumes that the regression coe¢ cients decline geometrically over time. This
means that (1 ) estimates the decline rate of the impact of the independent variables. The
coe¢ cients of the regressors in equation (1) are short run multipliers, i.e. they capture the
impact in a single time period. The long run multipliers can then obtained by dividing each
short run multiplier by 1 minus the lag of the endogenous variable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld
(1981), p. 232). In other terms, equation (1) can be written as:
yst   yst 1 =   SPst + Nst + Zst + s + t + st: (1.1)
On the RHS we have the short-run coe¢ cients. If  < 1; then (??) converges to steady state
and therefore we can write:
(1  )yst =   SPst + Nst + Zst + s + t + st: (1.2)
Hence, the long run equation can be written as:
yst =

(1  )  SPst +

(1  )Nst +

(1  )Zst +
s
(1  ) +
t
(1  ) + st (1.3)
where 
(1 ) and

(1 ) represent the long run coe¢ cients of respectively Senators per capita
and the linear population term.
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Fig. 1: Real spending per capita and state overrepresentation
 
 
Fig. 2. Population (top) and real federal spending per capita (bottom):  
Averages 1978-2002 
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Figure 3: Estimated fixed effects (from equations without senators per capita) and 
average state population (1978-2002) 
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Fig. 4a: State shares of population and state shares of federal spending 
(1978=100)
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 Fig. 4b: State shares of population and state shares of federal spending (1978=100) 
Graphs by state
year
 spending index  population index
NC
-35.4194
194.108
ND NE NH NJ
NM
-35.4194
194.108
NV NY OH OK
OR
-35.4194
194.108
PA RI SC SD
TN
-35.4194
194.108
TX UT VA VT
1978 2002
WA
1978 2002
-35.4194
194.108
WI
1978 2002
WV
1978 2002
WY
1978 2002
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: State Population Index (POPIND) (base year: 1978) 
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Fig. 5. US POPIND by state  
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Table 1: Average population, overrepresentation, and spending in the period 1978-2002
state population (millions) Senate overrepresentation
Federal spending per 
capita (real 1983 
thousands USD)
WY 0.480 10.844 3.144
VT 0.558 9.305 2.726
ND 0.651 7.995 3.807
DE 0.677 7.692 2.731
SD 0.715 7.254 3.329
MT 0.836 6.210 3.340
RI 0.993 5.227 3.297
ID 1.080 4.838 2.862
NH 1.082 4.820 2.673
ME 1.204 4.310 3.212
NV 1.302 4.376 2.810
NM 1.553 3.364 4.437
NE 1.618 3.207 2.969
UT 1.812 2.904 2.738
WV 1.851 2.815 3.020
AR 2.419 2.146 2.856
KS 2.511 2.066 3.093
MS 2.639 1.966 3.249
IA 2.856 1.820 2.736
OR 2.942 1.772 2.635
OK 3.235 1.605 2.975
CT 3.260 1.592 3.632
CO 3.499 1.499 3.170
SC 3.523 1.477 2.897
KY 3.781 1.372 2.910
AZ 3.805 1.418 3.046
AL 4.121 1.259 3.227
LA 4.323 1.201 2.873
MN 4.439 1.170 2.617
MD 4.757 1.093 4.447
WA 4.945 1.060 3.383
WI 4.977 1.043 2.375
TN 5.017 1.036 3.080
MO 5.194 0.999 3.721
IN 5.671 0.915 2.440
MA 6.014 0.863 3.664
VA 6.199 0.840 4.595
GA 6.663 0.789 2.795
NC 6.803 0.767 2.504
NJ 7.826 0.663 2.793
MI 9.447 0.549 2.444
OH 10.978 0.473 2.652
IL 11.711 0.443 2.561
PA 11.978 0.433 3.054
FL 12.854 0.412 3.160
TX 17.447 0.300 2.695
NY 18.125 0.286 3.104
CA 29.102 0.180 3.176
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Population overall 5.20  5.48 0.43 35.12 N =    1200
between 5.47 0.48 29.10 n =      48
within 0.81 -1.60 11.21 T =      25
Senate overrepresentation overall 0.97  0.99 0.06 4.71 N =    1200
between 1.00 0.07 4.18 n =      48
within 0.13 0.16 2.25 T =      25
Federal spending per capita overall 3.08  0.61 1.79 5.68 N =    1200
between 0.50 2.37 4.60 n =      48
within 0.35 1.53 4.91 T =      25
Direct payments to individuals overall 1.58  0.33 0.80 3.53 N =    1200
between 0.18 1.12 2.07 n =      48
within 0.28 0.73 3.45 T =      25
Grants overall 0.52  0.17 0.23 1.39 N =    1200
between 0.12 0.34 0.95 n =      48
within 0.12 0.26 1.04 T =      25
Formula Grants overall 0.391 0.15 0.15 0.95 N =     960
between 0.08 0.25 0.61 n =      48
within 0.12 0.14 0.79 T =      20
Non-Formula Grants overall 0.183 0.08 0.08 0.77 N =     960
between 0.07 0.11 0.53 n =      48
within 0.03 0.07 0.43 T =      20
Formula grants (share of total) overall 0.676 0.08 0.34 0.84 N =     960
between 0.05 0.49 0.76 n =      48
within 0.06 0.45 0.82 T =      20
No Formula grants (share of total) overall 0.324 0.08 0.16 0.66 N =     960
between 0.05 0.24 0.51 n =      48
within 0.06 0.18 0.55 T =      20
Salaries overall 0.41  0.19 0.08 1.38 N =    1008
between 0.19 0.17 1.22 n =      48
within 0.05 0.06 0.57 T =      21
Defense overall 0.54  0.36 0.06 2.51 N =    1200
between 0.34 0.11 1.99 n =      48
within 0.15 -0.19 1.33 T =      25
Spending variables are expressed in thousands per capita
Table 3: OLS regressions with real federal outlays per capita as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Variable: real per capita federal spending in all columns
senators per capita 0.0255 0.0026 0.0010 0.0026 0.0052 0.3452 0.7368
(0.42) (0.96) (0.30) (0.67) (1.25) (5.02)*** (7.30)***
population -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0374 -0.0675
(0.98) (2.11)** (1.21) (5.02)*** (3.72)***
PRincome -0.0042 -0.0397 -0.0737
(2.41)** (3.07)*** (2.14)**
unemployment 0.0038 0.0046 0.0014
(1.59) (0.83) (0.11)
aged 0.2418 3.5910 10.0498
(0.75) (2.17)** (2.99)***
kids -0.4785 -2.7317 -8.5637
(1.24) (2.16)** (3.39)***
dependent variable at t-1 0.9896 0.9894 0.9727 0.9735 0.6252
(138.45)*** (139.29)*** (84.64)*** (78.61)*** (12.73)***
Constant 3.0513 0.0637 0.0686 0.2900 0.2889 2.0337 4.9250
(29.65)*** (3.25)*** (3.50)*** (6.71)*** (2.24)** (3.84)*** (4.30)***
Observations 1200 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1200
R-squared (overall) 0.0017 0.9143 0.9143 0.9417 0.9421 0.9541 0.9177
short run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.0019078  -.0001964 -.0000728 -.0012515 -.0010832 -.0632542 -.1226095 
(0.42) (0.96) (0.30) (2.76)*** (2.13)** (6.47)*** (6.25)***
long run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.0188326 -.0567025 -.0458381 -.0408237 -.1687544
(0.90) (0.99) (2.02)** (1.73)* (6.60 )***
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4a: OLS regressions with aggregates from the Statistical Abstract (without state fixed effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable
direct 
payments to 
individuals 
(1978-2002)
grants        
(1977-2002)
salaries       
(1982-2002)
defense       
(1977-2002)
senators per capita 0.0062 0.0061 0.0021 -0.0057
(1.35) (2.37)** (0.18) (2.68)**
state population -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0005
(0.56) (0.94) (0.76) (2.10)**
income -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0062 -0.0019
(3.04)*** (1.40) (1.06) (1.50)
unemployment 0.0022 0.0012 -0.0101 -0.0030
(1.38) (1.78)* (1.40) (1.78)*
% aged above 65 0.5428 0.0698 -2.3510 -0.2039
(2.15)** (0.76) (1.53) (1.48)
% in schooling age (5-17) -0.3818 -0.1419 -1.4051 -0.1620
(2.15)** (1.90)* (1.34) (0.78)
dependent variable at t-1 0.9506 0.9680 0.5690 0.9678
(23.99)*** (50.82)*** (2.17)** (75.48)***
Constant 0.1520 0.0597 0.9480 0.1175
(1.92)* (1.92)* (1.74)* (1.64)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects no no no no
Observations 1152 1200 960 1200
R-squared 0.9741 0.9535 0.6617 0.9369
short run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.0007055 000199 -.0012742 -.0000736
(2.30)** (0.68) (0.98) (0.37)
long run marginal effect of 
population at the mean  -.0142841 -.00621 -.0029567 -.0022901
(1.11 ) (0.82) (1.09) (0.37)
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4b: OLS regressions with aggregates from the Statistical Abstract (with state fixed effects)
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variable
direct 
payments to 
individuals 
(1978-2002)
grants        
(1977-2002)
salaries       
(1982-2002)
defense       
(1977-2002)
senators per capita 0.0416 0.0430 0.1104 0.0076
(1.97)* (2.25)** (2.96)*** (0.34)
state population -0.0072 -0.0034 -0.0202 -0.0092
(2.16)** (1.49) (3.83)*** (1.45)
income -0.0078 -0.0038 0.0001 -0.0258
(2.59)** (1.46) (0.02) (2.49)**
unemployment 0.0064 0.0029 -0.0011 -0.0081
(4.30)*** (2.76)*** (0.38) (2.05)**
% aged above 65 0.2514 0.4298 -0.6771 0.1964
(0.48) (1.57) (0.61) (0.15)
% in schooling age (5-17) -1.0944 -0.6147 0.0184 -0.5527
(3.22)*** (3.34)*** (0.03) (1.36)
dependent variable at t-1 0.9177 0.7325 0.0451 0.7011
(11.13)*** (20.76)*** (0.92) (15.25)***
Constant 0.4585 0.2774 0.5761 0.7005
(2.12)** (3.70)*** (2.78)*** (2.37)**
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects no no no no
Observations 1152 1200 960 1200
R-squared 0.9768 0.9596 0.9650 0.9469
short run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.0103144 -.0066055 -.0284184 -.0097332
(2.38)** (2.32)** (5.37)*** (1.48)
long run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.1253026 -.0246901 -.0297612 -.0325607
(1.38) (2.45)** (5.61)*** (1.41)
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Change and scale effects (OLS regressions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable federal spending direct payments to individuals grants salaries defense
federal  spending 
except defense
senators per capita 0.1803 0.0016 -0.0121 0.0153 0.0573 0.1288
(1.77)* (0.06) (0.44) (0.22) (1.07) (1.69)*
population index -0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0011 0.0006 -0.0037
(2.41)** (1.73)* (2.79)*** (1.65) (1.28) (4.62)***
state population -0.0225 -0.0037 0.0020 -0.0122 -0.0139 -0.0042
(1.89)* (1.68) (1.09) (1.94)* (2.14)** (0.59)
income -0.0420 -0.0083 -0.0044 -0.0012 -0.0257 -0.0164
(3.27)*** (2.78)*** (1.59) (0.29) (2.45)** (2.04)**
unemployment 0.0041 0.0064 0.0029 -0.0016 -0.0081 0.0141
(0.72) (4.27)*** (2.77)*** (0.57) (2.02)** (2.86)***
% aged above 65 3.5114 0.2389 0.4095 -0.8069 0.2724 4.6212
(2.00)* (0.45) (1.39) (0.72) (0.21) (3.51)***
% in schooling age (5-17) -2.7014 -1.0738 -0.5976 0.1585 -0.5921 -2.1292
(2.17)** (3.18)*** (3.35)*** (0.23) (1.46) (2.21)**
dependent variable at t-1 0.6128 0.9117 0.7092 0.0425 0.6968 0.4982
(12.93)*** (10.60)*** (17.76)*** (0.91) (14.75)*** (10.54)***
Constant 2.3763 0.5409 0.3898 0.7123 0.6211 2.1081
(4.36)*** (2.19)** (4.55)*** (3.29)*** (2.02)** (4.98)***
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1152 1152 1200 960 1200 1152
Overall R-squared 0.9545 0.9768 0.9604 0.9660 0.9470 0.9539
short run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.0360194 -.0037719 .0028852 -.0133107 -.0181566 0.0138
(2.10)** (1.09) (0.77 ) (1.45) (1.96)** (1.17)
long run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -.0930315 -.0427245 .0099223 -.0139019 -.0598846 0.0275
(2.21 )** (1.01 ) (0.78) (1.46) (2.02)** (1.17)
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 6:  predicted spending (outlays, real 1983 USD)
POPIND POPIND
per capita share of per capita share of
state average
% deviation 
from US total spending grants  (real 1983 USD)  state average 
 (real 1983 
USD)
state 
average
NV 195.43 67.95% 2784 388 -166.05 -5.96% -63.26 -16.32%
AZ 160.35 37.80% 2998 413 -92.37 -3.08% -35.19 -8.53%
FL 148.41 27.54% 3141 343 -67.31 -2.14% -25.64 -7.48%
UT 137.65 18.30% 2682 443 -44.71 -1.67% -17.03 -3.85%
TX 133.18 14.45% 2637 379 -35.32 -1.34% -13.46 -3.55%
GA 131.28 12.82% 2756 459 -31.34 -1.14% -11.94 -2.60%
CA 130.50 12.15% 3121 480 -29.69 -0.95% -11.31 -2.36%
WA 130.38 12.05% 3291 480 -29.44 -0.89% -11.22 -2.34%
CO 129.32 11.13% 3090 408 -27.20 -0.88% -10.36 -2.54%
NM 127.85 9.87% 4381 682 -24.12 -0.55% -9.19 -1.35%
NH 124.50 6.99% 2636 446 -17.08 -0.65% -6.51 -1.46%
ID 122.48 5.26% 2773 474 -12.86 -0.46% -4.90 -1.03%
NC 122.11 4.94% 2468 430 -12.07 -0.49% -4.60 -1.07%
SC 121.41 4.34% 2861 457 -10.61 -0.37% -4.04 -0.89%
OR 119.97 3.10% 2581 527 -7.58 -0.29% -2.89 -0.55%
VA 119.73 2.90% 4519 351 -7.08 -0.16% -2.70 -0.77%
DE 115.99 -0.32% 2699 511 0.78 0.03% 0.30 0.06%
TN 115.79 -0.49% 3042 496 1.20 0.04% 0.46 0.09%
MD 114.68 -1.44% 4287 485 3.53 0.08% 1.34 0.28%
VT 114.60 -1.51% 2676 681 3.70 0.14% 1.41 0.21%
OK 113.84 -2.17% 2897 458 5.29 0.18% 2.02 0.44%
WY 112.84 -3.02% 3102 955 7.39 0.24% 2.81 0.29%
AR 111.63 -4.06% 2774 501 9.93 0.36% 3.78 0.75%
AL 110.55 -4.99% 3183 482 12.20 0.38% 4.65 0.96%
MN 110.32 -5.20% 2481 491 12.70 0.51% 4.84 0.99%
ME 110.28 -5.23% 3183 630 12.77 0.40% 4.86 0.77%
MS 109.98 -5.49% 3187 575 13.41 0.42% 5.11 0.89%
LA 108.46 -6.79% 2816 576 16.60 0.59% 6.32 1.10%
KY 108.35 -6.89% 2871 524 16.83 0.59% 6.41 1.22%
MO 107.17 -7.90% 3573 452 19.31 0.54% 7.35 1.63%
MT 107.16 -7.91% 3071 716 19.32 0.63% 7.36 1.03%
KS 106.99 -8.05% 2938 397 19.67 0.67% 7.49 1.89%
NJ 106.99 -8.05% 2776 469 19.68 0.71% 7.50 1.60%
RI 106.53 -8.45% 3261 674 20.66 0.63% 7.87 1.17%
WI 106.28 -8.67% 2313 476 21.18 0.92% 8.07 1.70%
IN 105.29 -9.52% 2373 384 23.26 0.98% 8.86 2.31%
CT 104.61 -10.10% 3573 520 24.67 0.69% 9.40 1.81%
IL 104.56 -10.14% 2515 445 24.79 0.99% 9.44 2.12%
MA 104.22 -10.44% 3560 625 25.50 0.72% 9.71 1.55%
SD 103.68 -10.90% 3100 678 26.63 0.86% 10.14 1.50%
NE 103.15 -11.36% 2755 456 27.75 1.01% 10.57 2.32%
MI 102.90 -11.57% 2407 484 28.28 1.17% 10.77 2.23%
OH 102.59 -11.83% 2654 447 28.91 1.09% 11.01 2.47%
NY 102.40 -12.00% 3061 750 29.31 0.96% 11.17 1.49%
PA 101.51 -12.76% 3016 502 31.19 1.03% 11.88 2.37%
ND 99.71 -14.31% 3382 726 34.96 1.03% 13.32 1.84%
WV 99.47 -14.51% 2983 628 35.47 1.19% 13.51 2.15%
IA 98.28 -15.54% 2502 433 37.97 1.52% 14.46 3.34%
(1) The Average predicted difference is obtained by substracting the average state spending percapita predicted using the average 
US population index from the average state spending  percapita predicted using the state average population index during the period 
1978-2002. 
 average spending  percapita predicted difference: total predicted spending 
Table 7: Formula vs non-formula grants from CFFR 1983-2002 (OLS regressions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable all grants all grants formula grants non-formula formula non-formula
senators per capita 0.0402* -0.0439 0.0392* 0.0013 -0.0172 -0.0305
(1.78) (1.15) (1.93) (0.08) (0.69) (0.98)
population index -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0003*
(3.42) (3.31) (1.87)
state population -0.0054 0.0017 -0.0046* -0.001 0.0002 0.0017
(1.55) (0.67) (1.76) (0.55) (0.13) (0.79)
income -0.0043 -0.0056 -0.0048* 0.0013 -0.0058** 0.0009
(1.12) (1.49) (1.96) (0.38) (2.31) (0.27)
unemployment 0.0033* 0.0029* 0.0021 0.0014* 0.0017 0.0012
(1.96) (1.71) (1.61) (1.83) (1.40) (1.55)
% aged above 65 1.1891** 1.1579** 0.6935 0.6343** 0.6658 0.5874**
(2.66) (2.44) (1.46) (2.65) (1.39) (2.35)
% in schooling age (5-17) -0.6414* -0.5355* 0.3906 -0.2433 -0.3237 -0.1978
(1.86) (1.75) (1.50) (1.07) (1.28) (0.98)
dependent variable at t-1 0.7157*** 0.6835*** 0.725*** 0.5869 0.6954 0.5779***
(15.43) (14.18) (9.91) (13.23) (9.41) (12.10)
Constant 0.2444** 0.2506** 0.2064** 0.0247 0.1742** 0.0739
(2.13) (2.18) (2.14) (0.39) (2.08) (1.13)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
State Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912
Overall R-squared 0.9695 0.9702 0.9708 0.9248 0.9714 0.9254
short run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -0.0084** 0.0157 -0.0075** -0.0011 0.0015 0.004
(2.06) (1.01) (2.44) (0.43) (0.48) (0.93)
long run marginal effect of 
population at the mean -0.0296** 0.005 -0.0274*** 0.0026 0.005 0.0094
(2.03) (1.00 ) (2.67) (0.41) (0.47) (0.99)
Robust t statistics in parentheses from standard errors clustered by state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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